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HOPEFUL CLARITY OR HOPELESS DISARRAY?: AN
EXAMINATION OF TOWN OF GREECE V. GALLOWAY
AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Krista M. Pikus+
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states that “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”1 While this Clause may
seem straightforward, history and differing interpretations have led to an
unresolved debate over its meaning and application.2 Most First Amendment
scholars agree that U.S. Supreme Court caselaw interpreting the Establishment
Clause is a conflicted muddle.3 This is no new condition; Supreme Court Justice
Clarence Thomas opined twenty years ago that “our Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is in hopeless disarray.”4
In the spring of 2014, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to remedy the
malady of its Establishment Clause jurisprudence with Town of Greece v.
+
J.D., Notre Dame Law School, 2015; B.S. in Business, B.A. in Psychology, Miami University,
2012. I am grateful for Notre Dame’s Program on Church, State & Society for the opportunity to
learn about the Establishment Clause from a seminar co-taught by Associate Justice Clarence
Thomas of the Supreme Court of the United States and Professor Richard Garnett. I am also
grateful for Professor Donald L. Drakeman’s comments and insights on this piece, the staff
members of the Catholic University Law Review for their hard work editing this piece, and my
family for their continuous love and support. All errors are my own.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See Carl H. Esbeck, Uses and Abuses of Textualism and Originalism in Establishment
Clause Interpretation, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 489, 495–96; Frederick Mark Gedicks, Incorporation
of the Establishment Clause Against the States: A Logical, Textual, and Historical Account, 88 IND.
L.J. 669, 670–72 (2013); Vincent Phillip Munoz, The Original Meaning of the Establishment
Clause and the Impossibility of its Incorporation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 585, 588–604 (2006);
Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause, 14 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 73, 76–78 (2005); see also William P. Marshall, Unprecedential Analysis and Original
Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 925, 930–31 (1986) (noting ambiguities in the historical record
regarding whether the Establishment Clause was intended to allow accommodation of religion or
require strict separation).
3. See Patrick M. Garry, Distorting the Establishment Clause into an Individual Dissenter’s
Right, 7 CHARLESTON L. REV. 661, 661–62 (2013); Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme
Court’s Four Establishment Clauses, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 725, 725 (2006) (“It is by now axiomatic
that the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is a mess—both hopelessly confused
and deeply contradictory.”); Shannon Chapla, ND Expert: SCOTUS Ruled Correctly on Legislative
Prayer, NOTRE DAME NEWS (May 5, 2014), http://news.nd.edu/news/48143-nd-expert-scotusruled-correctly-on-legislative-prayer/ (“[T]he law in this area remains as muddled and difficult to
apply as . . . it has been for the past 30 years.”).
4. Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice
Thomas’s view has not since grown more favorable. See Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am.
Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 13 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (protesting this “jurisprudence in
shambles” and “this Court’s nebulous Establishment Clause analyses” that “has confounded the
lower courts”).
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Galloway.5 There, the Court held that a New York town’s practice of opening
its town board meetings with a prayer offered by clergy members did not violate
the Establishment Clause.6 The Court, however, did not use any of its previously
enumerated tests for assessing Establishment Clause violations.7 Instead, the
Court focused on the historical pedigree of government invocations and the
nondiscriminatory procedures the town implemented in its invocation practice.8
Despite the Court’s resolution of Town of Greece by an appeal to tradition,9
the test the Court will use to assess future Establishment Clause challenges in
other factual contexts remains unpredictable.10 This Essay asks whether there is
any hope for clarity in Establishment Clause jurisprudence after Town of Greece.
Part I analyzes the confusion surrounding current Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, and Parts II and III analyze what is wrong with that jurisprudence.
Lastly, Part IV analyzes possible solutions for remedying the confusion and
misapplication of Establishment Clause jurisprudence and proposes modest
steps to achieve that goal. Specifically, it discusses practical and theoretical
implications of these solutions and focuses on whether amending the level of
scrutiny used in Establishment Clause cases is a viable option.
I. CONFUSION ABOUT THE TRUE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE?
Interpretations of the original meaning of the Establishment Clause typically
fall on a spectrum between strict-separationism and nonpreferentialism.11 In one
contentious context, government financial subsidies, the current debate focuses
on whether the Establishment Clause permits nonpreferential aid to religion or
requires strict separation forbidding any government aid to religions.12 Another
5. 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
6. Id. at 1828.
7. See infra notes 182–90 and accompanying text.
8. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1824–28.
9. Id. at 1828.
10. See Chapla, supra note 3.
11. See Munoz, supra note 2, at 588–604; Natelson, supra note 2, at 76–78; see also Marshall,
supra note 2, at 930–31 (discussing ambiguities in the historical record regarding whether the
Establishment Clause was intended to allow accommodation of religion or require strict
separation). Outside these boundaries are yet other approaches to the interpretation of the
Establishment Clause. See infra Part I.B.
12. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 99–106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The
Establishment Clause did not require government neutrality between religion and irreligion nor did
it prohibit the Federal Government from providing nondiscriminatory aid to religion.”); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (“The concept of a ‘wall’ of separation is a useful figure of
speech probably deriving from views of Thomas Jefferson. The metaphor has served as a reminder
that the Establishment Clause forbids an established church or anything approaching it. But the
metaphor itself is not a wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that
in fact exists between church and state.”); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786–92 (1983)
(discussing the purposes of “separation” and “neutrality” within the meaning of the Establishment
Clause).
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prominent dispute centers on the government’s authority to evince support for
religious positions.13
In 1878, the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. United States14 first considered the
relevance of the Establishment Clause to the famous metaphor Thomas Jefferson
included in his letter to the Danbury Baptist Association.15 Jefferson wrote that
the Establishment Clause built a “wall of separation between church and
State.”16 In 1947, the Supreme Court again invoked this “wall of separation”
metaphor in Everson v. Board of Education,17 holding that the Establishment
Clause binds the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.18 The function and
significance of Jefferson’s “wall” metaphor remains contested.19
While the history preceding the Establishment Clause is largely undisputed,
the debate rages over which historical facts are most important, how they should
be understood, and how they should control the interpretation of the
Establishment Clause.20
A. Historical Background
One difficulty in interpreting the Establishment Clause is that the historical
record appears to present support for different sides of the debate. For instance,
many people cite Jefferson’s letter to the Danbury Baptist Association or James

13. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 803–04, 804 n.15 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The second purpose of
separation and neutrality is to keep the state from interfering in the essential autonomy of religious
life, either by taking upon itself the decision of religious issues, or by unduly involving itself in the
supervision of religious institutions or officials . . . . A court, for example, will refuse to decide an
essentially religious issue even if the issue is otherwise properly before the court, and even if it is
asked to decide it.”).
14. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
15. Id. at 163–64. The Court quoted Thomas Jefferson’s letter and found it authoritative in
interpreting the Establishment Clause:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God;
that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship; that the legislative powers
of the government reach actions only, and not opinions,—I contemplate with sovereign
reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature
should “make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof,” thus building a wall of separation between church and State.
Id. at 164.
16. Id.
17. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
18. Id. at 15–16.
19. See William J. Cornelius, Church and State—The Mandate of the Establishment Clause:
Wall of Separation or Benign Neutrality?, 16 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 11–13 (1984); Arlen Specter,
Defending the Wall: Maintaining Church/State Separation in America, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 575, 577 (1995); cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (“The concept of a ‘wall’
of separation is a useful figure of speech probably deriving from views of Thomas Jefferson. The
metaphor has served as a reminder that the Establishment Clause forbids an established church or
anything approaching it.”).
20. See generally Specter, supra note 19.
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Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance in support of a separationist approach.21
Others refer to those same sources as consistent with religious accommodation.22
Adding further complexity is the apparent tensions within the views and acts of
these notable Founding-Era figures.23 When Madison was President, he sat on
a committee that appointed a congressional chaplain and proclaimed national
days of prayer.24 However, when Madison was in retirement, he wrote in
opposition to such practices.25 While Thomas Jefferson wrote of a “wall of
separation,”26 he also approved federal funding for a Christian missionary
performing outreach to the Native Americans.27 These seemingly contradictory
actions and words lead us to ask: wherein lies the Framers’ true intent and the
original meaning of the text?
One interpretive aid to understanding the true intent of the Framers is the
legislative history. Resolving the proper relationship between church and state
does not appear to have been on the list of priorities for the Framers of the U.S.
Constitution.28 Instead, the religion clauses were a response to the demands of
several states for a Bill of Rights in the Constitution as a condition for
ratification.29
Although few details are recorded in the debate regarding the Establishment
Clause, several states did raise concerns over the prospect of the establishment
of a national church.30 Even though the history often conflicts, the primary
intention of the First Congress seems to be at least clear on one point: to prevent

21. See McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 876 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S.
677, 724–25 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590, 608 (1992);
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673; Walz
v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 685 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); Sch. Dist. of Abington
Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 213 (1963); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 428 (1962); Everson,
330 U.S. at 16; Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 163–64.
22. See Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 153–66 (1991).
23. David Barton, The Image and the Reality: Thomas Jefferson and the First Amendment,
17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 399, 402–03 (2003) (arguing that “there are vast
numbers of Jefferson quotes and actions which, should they be considered seriously by the Court,
would cause at least a serious reassessment of its landmark Establishment Clause rulings and quite
probably a dramatic reversal”). In addition, either the “fervent religionists” or the “ardent
secularists” could cite Jefferson’s quotes and actions as authority.
24. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787–88, 788 n.8 (1983).
25. Id. at 807, 815 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
26. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164).
27. See Barton, supra note 23, at 404; James A. Davids, Putting Faith in Prison Programs,
and Its Constitutionality Under Thomas Jefferson’s Faith-Based Initiative, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV.
341, 342 (2008).
28. See Barton, supra note 23, at 436–39 (illustrating that the “separation of Church and
State” was never once mentioned in the Constitutional Convention debates).
29. See DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH, STATE, AND ORIGINAL INTENT 213–18
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2010).
30. Id. at 198.
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Congress from establishing a national church or religion.31 Although the
prohibition of a national church may be clear, how religion is defined from a
constitutional perspective is not.32
B. Meaning of the Text
Evidenced by scholars’ varying proposals, discerning the original meaning of
the language of the Establishment Clause is challenging.33 The Framers did not
include definitions for the words in the First Amendment because the
circumstances giving rise to the Bill of Rights did not require them to define
such terms.34 One scholar suggests that the meaning of “establishment” was
undergoing transition and was being used in a variety of ways during the time
of the nation’s Founding.35 The word “establishment” was often used
inconsistently during the Founding Era.36 Some evidence suggests that taxes to
support religious purposes might be permissible, yet some Founders viewed that
as an indication of an establishment.37
Even if there were multiple connotations for “establishment,” other language
in the Clause is still heavily debated.38 Many have interpreted “respecting an
establishment of religion” to be evidence of the enhanced federalism argument
to ensure the federal government would not interfere with state establishments.39
The Supreme Court in County of Allegheny v. ACLU40 discussed other phrases
that may have been used instead of “respecting,” such as “touching,”41 and
concluded that a government display of religious symbols falls under the

31. Id. at 231.
32. Krista M. Pikus, Comment, Quasi-Rights for Quasi-Religious Organizations: A New
Framework Resolving Religious-Secular Dichotomy After Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 90 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. ONLINE 16, 18–21 (2014).
33. See PHILLIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 9–10 (Harv. Univ. Press,
2004); Natelson, supra note 2, at 76–78; see also Lisa Shaw Roy, History, Transparency, and the
Establishment Clause: A Proposal for Reform, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 683, 715 (2008) (advocating
for a procedural solution in which the Court separates its treatment of history from its analysis of
law).
34. See DRAKEMAN, supra note 29, at 226; WILLIAM GERALD MCLOUGHLIN, NEW
ENGLAND DISSENT, 1630–1833, at 783 (Oxford Univ. Press 1971).
35. See DRAKEMAN, supra note 29, at 216.
36. Id. at 230–60.
37. Id. at 232–33.
38. Id. at 180–85.
39. See id. at 232–44, 319; see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45
(2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that “the Establishment Clause is a federalism
provision”).
40. 492 U.S. 573 (1989), abrogated by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
41. Id. 649.
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establishment prohibition.42 An even more fundamental question is: what is
“religion”?43
C. Difficulty in Defining Religion
One of the biggest challenges presented in cases governed by the religion
clauses is determining whether an organization or practice constitutes
“religion.”44 This particular challenge is marked in the case of a religion not in
existence or present in the American experience when the Constitution was
drafted.45 It is argued that at a minimum, the Framers conceived religion to be
theistic.46 Regardless, courts have held that newer religions deserve full First
Amendment protection.47 While there is some evidence that one motivation for
including the religion clauses was to avert political contest among sects of
Christianity, they are now considered to apply to all religions.48 Generally,
though, courts have avoided defining religion because doing so, as some assert,
would violate the Establishment Clause.49 Alternatively, it may be due to the
conceptual difficulty of the task.50

42. Id. at 613–21.
43. See, e.g., Dmitry N. Feofanov, Defining Religion: An Immodest Proposal, 23 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 309, 356–91 (1994); Michael Rhea, Denying and Defining Religion Under the First
Amendment: Waldorf Education as a Lens for Advocating a Broad Definitional Approach, 72 LA.
L. REV. 1095, 1103–09 (2012); Jane M. Ritter, The Legal Definition of Religion: From Eating Cat
Food to White Supremacy, 20 TOURO L. REV. 751, 761–86 (2004); Jeffrey Omar Usman, Defining
Religion: The Struggle To Define Religion Under the First Amendment and the Contributions and
Insights of Other Disciplines of Study Including Theology, Psychology, Sociology, the Arts, and
Anthropology, 83 N.D. L. REV. 123, 144-87 (2007).
44. See Pikus, supra note 32, at 18–21 (discussing the current legal standard for classifying
organizations as religious); cf. Susan J. Stabile, State Attempts To Define Religion: The
Ramifications of Applying Mandatory Prescription Contraceptive Coverage Statutes to Religious
Employers, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 741, 757 n.69 (2005) (discussing the paradoxical effect
that sometimes occurs when courts attempt to define organizations as religious).
45. Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1315 (D.N.J. 1977), aff’d per curiam, 592 F.2d 197
(3d Cir. 1979) (arguing that while today there are “philosophies and theories recognized as religions
or religious practices” that were unknown at the time the Constitution was drafted, the meaning of
religion has expanded over time and would fall under the First Amendment).
46. Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753,
757–58 (1984).
47. See Malnak, 440 F. Supp. at 1315.
48. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 35 (2004) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52–54 (1985)).
49. See Usman, supra note 43, at 145 (“[D]efining religion would violate the Constitution by
interfering with religious liberty and establishing religion.”).
50. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (“The
determination of what is a ‘religious’ belief or practice is more often than not a difficult and delicate
task . . .”); see also Usman, supra note 43, at 145 (discussing the difficulty the courts would face
in attempting to define religion).
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Despite popular resistance to defining religion, some courts and scholars have
attempted to do so.51 That effort navigates a fine line between an impermissible
questioning of the validity of religious beliefs and a permissible questioning of
whether a set of beliefs is a “religion” under the First Amendment.52 Although
many have attempted to define religion,53 its definition remains a delicate
question for courts deciding religious liberty claims.54 One approach to this task
identifies instances when the concept indisputably applies and then evaluates
more doubtful cases by analogizing them to the indisputable instances.55 This
method has been viewed as a safeguard against arbitrary judicial classifications
of religions.56
The modern Supreme Court has avoided defining religion,57 though it
previously gave some indication of what it considers to be a religion.58 In 1890,
the Supreme Court in Davis v. Beason59 stated that “‘religion’ has reference to
one’s views of his relations to his Creator.”60 In United States v. Macintosh,61
the Supreme Court noted that “[t]he essence of religion is [a] belief in a relation
to God.”62 Even James Madison, who is often cited to support strict51. See Feofanov, supra note 43, at 363–66, 368, 371, 374–90; Rhea, supra note 43, at 1103–
08; Usman, supra note 43, at 151–54, 165–88, 193–96, 200–17.
52. Compare Jones v. Bradley, 590 F.2d 294, 295 (9th Cir. 1979) (declaring “no prohibition[]
. . . against ruling whether or not a set of beliefs constitutes a religion”), with United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 (1944) (“So we conclude that the District Court ruled properly when it
withheld from the jury all questions concerning the truth or falsity of the religious beliefs or
doctrines of respondents.”); see also United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633–34 (1931)
(Hughes, C.J., dissenting) (describing religion as a “belief in a relation to God involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation”); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341 (1890)
(describing religion as “reference to one’s views of his relations [and obligations] to his Creator”).
53. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Defining “Religion” in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L.
REV. 579, 587–89, 593–95; see generally James M. Donovan, God Is as God Does: Law,
Anthropology, and the Definition of “Religion”, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 23 (1995). But see
Troy L. Booher, Finding Religion for the First Amendment, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 469, 469
(2004) (arguing that such attempts to define religion are misguided and “will not help . . . [with
interpreting] the religion clauses”).
54. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714 (“The determination of what is a ‘religious’ belief or practice is
more often than not a difficult and delicate task . . .”).
55. See Greenawalt, supra note 46, at 763.
56. See Eduardo Peñalver, The Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791, 794 (1997).
57. While the courts currently have no definitive test to define religion, some cases provide
insight to relevant factors. See LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 226
(3d Cir. 2007) (highlighting some of the factors the court examined in determining whether an
organization was religious, including: “(1) whether the entity operates for a profit, (2) whether it
produces a secular product, (3) whether the entity’s articles of incorporation or other pertinent
documents state a religious purpose, [or] (4) whether it is owned, affiliated with, or financially
supported by a formally religious entity such as a church or synagogue”).
58. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
59. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
60. Id. at 342.
61. 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
62. Id. at 633 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
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separationism, speaks multiple times of a duty to the “Creator” in his Memorial
and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments.63
As there was uncertainty pertaining to the meaning of the Establishment
Clause during the Founding Era, it is hard to expect a clear understanding of that
language today.64 Evidence indicates that the language can reasonably be
interpreted multiple ways.65
II. WHICH INTERPRETATION SHOULD CONTROL?
The participants in the debate over the meaning of the Establishment Clause
confidently cite history to support their position.66 Some Justices, including
Justice Hugo Black, supported the strict-separation approach,67 while others,
such as Justice William Rehnquist, advocated for the nonpreferential approach.68
On the other hand, Justice Thomas has advocated that the Establishment Clause
is an enhanced federalism provision to prevent the federal government from
interfering with states’ establishments.69 Each of these approaches has its
strengths and weaknesses.

63. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), in
2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 187 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901); see also Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421, 431–32 (1962) (citing Madison, supra, at 187); Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and
Religious Liberty: Seven Questions from Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance, 87 CORNELL L.
REV. 783, 798 (2002). Madison wrote in his Memorial and Remonstrance:
The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every
man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate. This right is in
its nature an unalienable right . . . It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator
such homage and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is precedent
both in order of time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society.
Madison, supra, at 184–85. For a discussion regarding the validity of Madison’s Memorial and
Remonstrance, see Letter from James Madison to William Bradford, Jr. (Jan. 24, 1774), in THE
MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 2–4 (Marvin
Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981).
64. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
66. See supra Part I.
67. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 425 (referring to a “wall of separation”); see also DAVID L. GREY,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NEWS MEDIA 40–41 (1968); ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK
522–23 (2d ed. 1997).
68. See Russell M. Mortyn, The Rehnquist Court and the New Establishment Clause, 19
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 567, 574–75 (1992).
69. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1835 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“I write separately to reiterate my view that the Establishment Clause is ‘best understood as a
federalism provision.’” (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 50 (2004)
(Thomas, J., concurring))); DRAKEMAN, supra note 29, at 232–47 (discussing the theory and
credibility of Justice Thomas’s enhanced federalism interpretation of the Establishment Clause).
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A. Strict-Separationism
Support for strict-separationism often relies on Jefferson’s views and his “wall
of separation” metaphor.70 Numerous Supreme Court cases have cited
Jefferson’s “wall” metaphor as a means of maintaining this separation.71
Evidence reveals that Jefferson harbored hostility towards religion.72
Furthermore, this strict-separationism view lacks constitutional authority.73
While the principle of “separation of Church and State” possesses some value,
the words themselves are not found in the Constitution.74 Some scholars
recommend that the phrase and idea it conveys should be viewed with suspicion,
given that it was a development from prejudice.75
B. Nonpreferentialism
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree76 provides a powerful
endorsement of nonpreferentialism.77 He maintained that the actions of the First
Congress confirm the view that the government should not prefer one religious
sect to another,78 but that accommodating religious faith and practice is
acceptable and was common during the Founding Era79 (e.g., national days of
prayer and Thanksgiving,80 the Northwest Ordinance’s legislative favor for
religious education,81 and land grants supporting religion82).
As evidence that the nonpreferential viewpoint triumphs, some scholars point
to the Framers’ choice of “an” establishment of religion over “the” establishment
of religion.83 Still, no persuasive evidence exists that the First Congress assigned
such significance to that distinction.84
When examining the totality of the evidence and the actions of the Framers,
the nonpreferentialism approach seems more reasonable than the strict-

70. See, e.g., Engel, 370 U.S. at 424–25.
71. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 708 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 600–01 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 91–92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948);
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
72. See DRAKEMAN, supra note 29, at 63.
73. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. (The words “wall of separation” and “separation of Church
and State” do not appear in the First Amendment).
74. Id.
75. See HAMBURGER, supra note 33, at 481–83.
76. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
77. Id. at 106, 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 100.
79. Id. at 101–03.
80. See id. at 113.
81. Id. at 100.
82. Id.
83. See DRAKEMAN, supra note 29, at 179.
84. Id. at 211–12.

396

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 65:387

separationist approach.85 However, given its major religious pluralism,
nonpreferentialism does not seem practicable in the current polity.86 This is not
a criticism of the nonpreferentialist interpretation but rather a practical
consideration. Because today’s circumstances have changed, some advocate for
a more workable approach.87 Importantly, however, changing the rule to reflect
the changing times may inadvertently unsettle the enduring meaning and
predictable operation of the Constitution in the long term.88 Additionally, new
proposed frameworks must beware of inviting judges to speculate on what
today’s culture requires, thereby extending, rather than cabining, judicial
discretion.89
C. Enhanced Federalism
The “enhanced federalism” interpretation advocates the view that the purpose
of the Establishment Clause is to prohibit the federal government from
interfering with state establishments.90 While this viewpoint has support, it is
unlikely that the sole purpose of the Establishment Clause is to protect state
establishments, as such a view contradicts historical evidence.91 If members of
the First Congress intended for this interpretation to apply, it was not recorded
in the proposed language.92 The majority of the records from the ratification
conventions and debates indicate that the Establishment Clause was intended to
prohibit the federal government from establishing a national religion.93 Even
James Madison, who is often cited in support of a separationist approach,
proposed the language “no national religion shall be established,” indicating that
perhaps even he did not think this should be implemented against the states.94
D. Incorporation Doctrine
Even if the Establishment Clause was only intended to prohibit Congress from
establishing a national religion, the Supreme Court held in Everson that the
Establishment Clause applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.95
Justice Thomas maintains that this is a flawed interpretation because the
85. For instance, several Founders who were later elected President proclaimed national days
of prayer and thanksgiving during their respective presidencies. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 633–35 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. Cf. Deborah Jones Merritt & Daniel C. Merritt, The Future of Religious Pluralism: Justice
O’Connor and the Establishment Clause, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 895, 948 (2007).
87. See id. at 943, 945, 947.
88. See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 221–24 and accompanying text.
90. DRAKEMAN, supra note 29, at 211.
91. See id. at 229.
92. Id. at 235–36.
93. Id. at 241.
94. Id. at 206.
95. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
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Establishment Clause resists incorporation by virtue of its underlying purpose.96
Justice Thomas believes that incorporation of the Establishment Clause
frustrates its original intention to allow states the freedom to make church-state
decisions without federal interference.97
While this interpretation is plausible based on the language of the Clause, the
records of the debate in the Annals of Congress do not contain specific support
for it.98 Additionally, even if this were the intent, it was neither discussed nor
considered a relevant issue during the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified.99 While this view is plausible, the lack of substantive historical support
leaves room for doubt.
III. WHAT’S WRONG WITH OUR ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Law Office History
Contributing to the conflicted character of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is the ambiguous historical material allowing for “law office
history,” where each side selects historical accounts that best support its
position.100 Two of the most significant Supreme Court cases decided on this
subject matter, Everson and Reynolds, have been accused of goal-oriented “law
office history.”101
The same accusation can be made on either side.102 With both sides
possessing the ability to selectively pick desirable support, having an objective,
honest argument is especially difficult.103 Interestingly, advocates on both sides
of the debate believe that they are adopting the true original meaning.104 With
numerous inconsistencies and a dearth of evidence, it is difficult to decide which
side is definitively correct. This creates a majority of the confusion and
“hopeless disarray” in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.105 Many Supreme
Court Justices are guilty of “law office history” in applying Establishment
Clause tests.106

96. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1835 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 693 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the
Establishment Clause resists incorporation); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 679–80
(Thomas, J., concurring).
97. See sources cited supra note 96.
98. See DRAKEMAN, supra note 29, at 235.
99. Id. at 322.
100. Id. at 8.
101. Id. at 10–11.
102. Id. at 11.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 13–14.
105. See Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
106. See DRAKEMAN, supra note 29, at 79–80.
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B. Inconsistent Application of Tests
Courts employ several different tests to assess government action under the
Establishment Clause.107 The available tests include: the coercion test, which is
used, for example, in school prayer evaluations;108 neutrality analysis, often
applied to assess government aid to religious schools;109 the endorsement
test, applied to government displays, legislation, and government
communications;110 and the Lemon test, as outlined in Lemon v. Kurtzman,111
used in many instances (except—for now—legislative prayer, as discussed
below).112 These tests are applied inconsistently.113 The “law office history”
phenomenon has its analogue in the sphere of judicial tests.114 These several
analytical options allow a judge to pick whichever test best facilitates his or her
desired outcome.
C. Prior and Current Tests
Each of the extant Establishment Clause tests possesses strengths and
weaknesses.115 The unpredictable nature in choosing and applying them is a
significant problem.116 Another issue is that the use of any of these tests may
allows the most important consideration to be cast aside: the basic principles of
the Establishment Clause itself.117
1. The Lemon Test
In Lemon,118 the Supreme Court established a three-part test to assess whether
a government action violates the Establishment Clause.119 The Lemon test
examines whether: (1) the statute has a secular legislative purpose;120 (2) its
107. See infra notes 108–12 and accompanying text.
108. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992).
109. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652–53 (2002).
110. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1984).
111. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
112. See id. at 614–15.
113. See generally Emily Fitch, Note, An Inconsistent Truth: The Various Establishment
Clause Tests as Applied in the Context of Public Displays of (Allegedly) “Religious” Symbols and
Their Applicability Today, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 431 (2014).
114. See infra Part III.C.
115. Fitch, supra note 113, at 434.
116. See, e.g., Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 487 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), rev’d, Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (emphasis added) (“We are free to apply
any or all of the three tests, and to invalidate any measure that fails any one of them. Because we
conclude that the school district policy impermissibly coerces a religious act and accordingly hold
the policy unconstitutional, we need not consider whether the policy fails the endorsement test or
the Lemon test as well.”).
117. See, e.g., infra Part III.C.1–3.
118. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
119. Id. at 612–13.
120. Id. at 612.
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primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion;121 and (3) it fosters
excessive government entanglement with religion.122 If a statute fails any of
these prongs, it violates the Establishment Clause.123 In the majority opinion,
Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote that the First Amendment sought to foreclose
the principle evil of “political division along religious lines.”124 Chief Justice
Burger believed that aid to religious schools could pose a danger of
unconstitutional entanglement due to this division.125
The primary arguments against the Lemon test are that it is too restrictive, not
reflective of the underlying principles, and results in unpredictable
application.126 Assessing the true “purpose” of legislation allows for unreliable
speculation.127 Although this test was popular for some time, its application has
since diminished and has been strongly criticized by some current Supreme
Court Justices.128 In Van Orden v. Perry,129 the Supreme Court specifically
declined to use the Lemon test in validating a Ten Commandments monument
displayed on government property.130 Yet, in a case decided the same day as
Van Orden, McCreary County v. ACLU,131 the Court employed the Lemon test
to strike down a display of Ten Commandments in county courthouses.132

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id. at 613.
Id. at 612–13.
Id. at 622.
Id.
See Cynthia V. Ward, Coercion and Choice Under the Establishment Clause, 39 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1621, 1623 (2006) (“The Court’s first formal methodology for analyzing
Establishment Clause issues, the so-called Lemon test, proved so ad hoc and unpredictable in
application that it has receded into the background as an analytical tool.”); see also Jay Schlosser,
Establishment Clause and Justice Scalia: What the Future Holds for Church and State, 63 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 380, 380–81 (1988) (arguing that Justice Scalia’s distaste for the Lemon test will
further divide the Court).
127. Choper, supra note 53, at 609.
128. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia criticizes the Lemon test, advocating for it to be dismantled
once and for all:
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment
Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school attorneys of
Center Moriches Free Union School District. . . . Over the years . . . no fewer than five
of the currently sitting Justices have . . . personally driven pencils through the creature’s
heart . . . and a sixth has joined an opinion doing so. . . . The secret of the Lemon test’s
survival, I think, is that it is so easy to kill. It is there to scare us (and our audience) when
we wish it to do so, but we can command it to return to the tomb at will.
Id. at 398–99.
129. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
130. Id. at 686.
131. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
132. Id. at 859–60.
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In 1983, the Supreme Court in Marsh v. Chambers133 did not even mention
the Lemon test in upholding the use of a legislative chaplain to offer prayers to
open sessions of the Nebraska Legislature.134 Had the Marsh Court applied the
Lemon test, Nebraska’s practice would likely have been held unconstitutional.135
Instead, the Court deemed the historical fact of the uninterrupted existence of a
decidedly non-secular legislative prayer practice throughout the history of the
nation to support its constitutional propriety.136 Marsh, then, implies doubt that
the Lemon test is consistent with the Framers’ intent and the original meaning of
the Clause.137 In any event, the fact that the Supreme Court treats the Lemon
test as optional facilitates analytical selectivity, paralleling the historical
selectivity critiqued above.138
2. Endorsement Test
In her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly,139 Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor proposed a new Establishment Clause test that would ask whether
state action “intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of
religion.”140 She urged this to be an improvement upon Lemon, as the Court
would not have to speculate about the effects of state action.141 The Court is
expected to employ this test from the perspective of the reasonable observer.142
As Justice Thomas opined in Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. American Atheists,
Inc.,143 the Court’s assessment of reasonableness is arbitrary at best.144
3. Neutrality Test
Another test the Supreme Court has employed in Establishment Clause cases
is the “neutrality” test.145 “Neutrality” has been interpreted multiple ways.146
Often, the neutrality test is interpreted as “evenhandedness.”147 However,
neutrality has also been interpreted as a “secular purpose” test, which

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

463 U.S. 783 (1983).
Id. at 795.
Id. at 800–01 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id.
See id. at 790–91 (majority opinion).
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
465 U.S. 668 (1984).
Id. at 691 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 688–89.
Id. at 690.
132 S. Ct. 12 (2011).
Id. at 21.
See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 640 (2002).
See id. at 670 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 696 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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controversially stipulates that a secular purpose is neutral and a religious one is
non-neutral.148
The “evenhandedness” interpretation of neutrality presents two virtues: (1) it
is more consistent with historical practices from around the Founding Era to
allow at least some aid for religious missions;149 and (2) it protects what seems
to be the widely agreed upon purpose of the Clause: to prohibit a national
establishment of religion.150
Nevertheless, this approach also has weaknesses.151 First, “evenhandedness”
is arguably not the original intent or meaning of the Establishment Clause.152
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Wallace highlights that neither Madison’s intent
nor the congressional debate records evince a concern with ensuring neutrality
from the government.153
The ability of the federal government to be “evenhanded” is questionable,
especially because there are significantly more religions in America today than
in the Founding Era.154 Therefore, one may argue, as Justice Hugo Black did,155
that a strict separation between church and state should be maintained, as
preferentialism could otherwise inevitably result. While this test contains flaws,
governmental evenhandedness between religions, as well as between religion
and irreligion, likely comes closer to achieving the intended result, relative to
other tests.156
The secular purpose test, on the other hand, fails for a few reasons: (1) in most
cases, the purpose of legislation is irrelevant in evaluating its constitutionality;
(2) even if the purpose of legislation was relevant, discerning legislative intent
is inherently speculative and unreliable; and (3) requiring a secular purpose for
all laws would effectively establish a secularist religion by privileging a nontheistic creed or philosophy as the lone driver of public policy.157 Moreover,
this test breeds confusion, especially when government aid to religions may have
a secular purpose. Nevertheless, modern political discourse encourages this
approach.158
148. See Steven D. Smith, The Paralyzing Paradox of Religious Neutrality 4 (Research Paper
No. 11-060, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1911399.
149. See Barton, supra note 23, at 408; cf. Davids, supra note 27, at 377.
150. See DRAKEMAN, supra note 29, at 232, 235–36.
151. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 99–100 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
152. See id. at 98.
153. Id.
154. Cf. Smith, supra note 148, at 19.
155. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962) (discussing the “wall of separation”).
156. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 99 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“None of the other Members of
Congress who spoke during the August 15th debate expressed the slightest indication that they
thought the language before them from the Select Committee, or the evil to be aimed at, would
require that the Government be absolutely neutral as between religion and irreligion.”).
157. See Greenawalt, supra note 46, at 791, 793–96.
158. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xxiii–xxiv, xxvi–xxvii (Colum. Univ.
Press 1993).
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4. Coercion Test
The Supreme Court has also employed the coercion test, especially in school
prayer cases.159 Although preventing coercion of religious practices is surely an
intent underlying the religion clauses,160 the use of this test by the Supreme
Court, like many of the others, has tended toward broader application than
envisioned by the historical concern.161 For instance, in Lee v. Weisman,162 the
Court adopted a “psychological coercion” standard that forbade an invocation at
a public high school graduation ceremony.163 The Court ruled that the social
expectations present in that ceremony exerted pressure on non-adherents to stand
or otherwise appear approving during the prayer, which constitutes unlawful
coercion.164 Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent maintained that only governmental
actions, such as forced attendance of religious services, would be a First
Amendment violation and urged the return to a “legal coercion” standard.165
IV. TOWN OF GREECE V. GALLOWAY: HOPEFUL CLARITY OR HOPELESS
DISARRAY?
Given the variability and inconsistent application of tests for the
Establishment Clause, when Town of Greece166 reached the Supreme Court, it
was uncertain which test would govern. In Town of Greece, the Supreme Court
evaluated the practice of the town of Greece, New York, to invite local clergy
members to offer prayers to open its monthly board meetings.167 Members of
the public often attended the meetings.168 These meetings served both legislative
and adjudicative purposes.169 Originally, selection for the chaplain of the month
was based on a Board representative calling congregations within Greece that

159. This test was first discussed in Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Allegheny County v. ACLU.
492 U.S. 573, 660 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). “Under [the coercion] test the government
does not violate the establishment clause unless it (1) provides direct aid to religion in a way that
would tend to establish a state church, or (2) coerces people to support or participate in religion
against their will.” Establishment Clause Overview, FIRST AMENDMENT CTR. (Sept. 16, 2011),
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/establishment-clause.
160. See HAMBURGER, supra note 33, at 62.
161. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631–32 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the
Court’s holding expands the coercion test to prohibit a prayer ceremony that has traditionally been
a part of American history).
162. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
163. Id. at 631–32 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 593 (majority opinion).
165. Id. at 640–41, 643 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[W]e have made clear our understanding that
school prayer occurs within a framework in which legal coercion to attend school (i.e., coercion
under threat of penalty) provides the ultimate backdrop.”).
166. 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
167. Id. at 1815.
168. Id. at 1846 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 1849 (majority opinion).
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were listed in a local directory.170 Later, the Board solely relied on a list of
chaplains who previously volunteered.171 Almost all of the congregations in
Greece were Christian.172 Accordingly, every participating minister between
1999 and 2007 was Christian.173 The ministers’ prayers contained both civic
and Christian themes.174
In 2010, two local residents brought suit claiming that Greece’s legislative
prayer practice violated the Establishment Clause.175 These residents alleged
that Greece excluded non-Christian prayer and impermissibly permitted
sectarian prayer.176 The U.S. District Court for the Western District of New
York found in favor of Greece under a neutrality theory because the town
exercised “no impermissible preference for Christianity.”177 The District Court
further reasoned that the governing Supreme Court precedent of Marsh v.
Chambers did not require legislative prayer to be non-sectarian.178 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the District Court,179 applying
the endorsement test and holding that the prayer practice in Greece conveyed its
official affiliation with Christianity to a reasonable objective observer.180
On May 5, 2014, in a narrow 5-4 ruling, the Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the Second Circuit.181 The Court focused on the longstanding
tradition of legislative prayer in the United States.182 The fact that the First
Congress appointed official chaplains demonstrated that this kind of legislative
prayer was contemplated and accepted by the Framers.183 A notable aspect of
the Court’s opinion was not the focus on tradition, which followed Marsh, but
rather the Justices’ wide variation regarding which test should be used in
Establishment Clause cases.184
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, did not even
discuss the Lemon test.185 The Court also did not discuss the endorsement test
explicitly,186 though Justice Kennedy invoked the reasonable observer when

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 1816.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1817.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1818.
Id.
Id. at 1828.
Id.
Id. at 1818–19.
See generally id.
See id. at 1815–28.
See generally id.
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analyzing whether Greece’s practices were coercive.187 Justice Thomas
concurred,188 emphasizing the Establishment Clause as an enhanced federalism
provision that resists incorporation.189 On the other hand, Justice Elena Kagan’s
dissent urged religious equality as a governing norm.190 Overall, the bulk of the
Court’s decision seemingly focused on coercion.191 Even after Town of Greece,
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is just as uncertain as it previously was.192
A. Ways to Improve
The controversies over Establishment Clause interpretations seem endless.
Supreme Court Justices widely differ in their interpretations.193 Evidence
suggests that even the Framers differed in their intentions and interpretations.194
Although achieving perfect agreement in the Establishment Clause may never
happen, modest improvements can be made.
1. Remedy the Doctrinal Jumble
It is long overdue for the Court to remedy its doctrinal jumble.195 This will
require, of course, overruling longstanding precedent. Maintaining bad law for
a longer period of time does not improve it. The Court declaring a more
definitive test or at least overruling incorrect precedent, like the Lemon test,
would be helpful. Admittedly, making a single test absolutely controlling is
risky, especially given the conflicting history.196 A better approach might be to
focus on the principles underlying the Establishment Clause and compare
upcoming cases to those principles.197 This way, courts are forced to go back to
the text when interpreting it, instead of analyzing the Establishment Clause
through the lens of new doctrinal language such as “endorsement” or
“neutrality.”198 The Supreme Court seems to have focused on these underlying
principles in Town of Greece, yet each Justice came to a different conclusion

187. Id. at 1825.
188. Id. at 1835 (Thomas, J., concurring).
189. Id. at 1835–36.
190. Id. at 1841 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 1827 (majority opinion).
192. See First Amendment-Establishment Clause—Legislative Prayer: Town of Greece v.
Galloway, 128 HARV. L. REV. 191, 197 (2014) (“Greece leaves uncertain the status and relevance
of the previous doctrinal tests, as well as exactly how history fits into those approaches.”).
193. Id. at 196–97.
194. See Barton, supra note 23, at 436; Davids, supra note 27; Smith, supra note 22, at 163–
64; see also DRAKEMAN, supra note 29, at 213–18.
195. See Simcha David Schonfeld, A Failing Grade: The Court in Zelman and Its Missed
Opportunity To Clarify the Confusing State of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 20 T.M.
COOLEY L. REV. 489, 489–90 (2003).
196. Id.
197. See supra Part I.A.
198. See supra Part III.C.2–3.
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with tradition only winning by a slim margin.199 Although a more definitive test
would be helpful in limiting judicial policy discretion, focusing on such
principles should result in more consistent long-term results. Yet, the Supreme
Court appears inclined to avoid the task of clarifying Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.200
2. Proposal for Adjusting the Level of Scrutiny
The Court will typically use the variety of tests discussed above to resolve an
Establishment Clause case.201 The use and credibility of these tests remains
uncertain and ever changing.202 There is at least one instance in which the Court
refused to use one of the previously mentioned tests and instead applied a strict
scrutiny test as an alternative.203
In Larson v. Valente,204 the Court evaluated a Minnesota statute intended to
protect charitable contributors by requiring tax-deductible charitable
organizations to register with the state.205 The statute exempted religious
organizations from registering if more than half of their contributions were from
their members.206 Well-established churches qualified for this exemption, while
newer churches did not.207 Accordingly, the Court held that the statute
differentiated among religious organizations and thus required strict scrutiny
review.208 As a result, a religiously preferential statute is invalid “unless it is
199. See generally Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
200. See generally id.; Schonfeld, supra note 195, at 489–90.
201. Cf. McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 859–62 (2005) (Lemon test); Van Orden v.
Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 685–86, 690–92 (2005) (endorsement test); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536
U.S. 639, 653 (2002) (private choice); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807–08 (2000) (Lemon
test); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 310–12 (2000) (coercion); Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 582–83, 585–86 (1987) (Lemon test); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
679, 681–85 (1984) (Lemon test); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40–43 (1980) (Lemon test);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (three-pronged test, now known as the Lemon
test); Epperson v. Ark., 393 U.S. 97, 104, 106–07, 109 (1968) (neutrality); Sch. Dist. of Abington
Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222–23 (1963) (neutrality).
202. See supra Part III.B.
203. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982).
204. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
205. Id. at 230.
206. Id. at 231–32.
207. Id. at 246–47, 246 n.23.
208. Id. at 246. The Court explained its rationale for using the strict scrutiny test over Lemon:
In short, when we are presented with a state law granting a denominational preference,
our precedents demand that we treat the law as suspect and that we apply strict scrutiny
in adjudging its constitutionality. The fifty per cent rule of [the statute] clearly grants
denominational preferences of the sort consistently and firmly deprecated in our
precedents. Consequently, that rule must be invalidated unless it is justified by a
compelling governmental interest. . . . Although application of the Lemon tests is not
necessary to the disposition of the case before us, those tests do reflect the same concerns
that warranted the application of strict scrutiny to [the statute’s] fifty per cent rule.
Id. at 246–47, 252 (internal citations omitted).
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justified by a compelling governmental interest and unless it is closely fitted to
further that interest.”209
Since Larson, the Court has rarely used strict scrutiny for an Establishment
Clause analysis.210 Nevertheless, any attempts to solidify a definitive test will
likely be futile given all the uncertainty and differing interpretations surrounding
the original intent and meaning of the Establishment Clause. A better, more
consistent, solution instead would be to adjust the level of scrutiny for
Establishment Clause issues and exclude other judicially made tests (such as the
Lemon test, coercion test, or neutrality test) from the analysis.
Even if Justice Thomas’s view of “resisting incorporation” is correct, the legal
community is unlikely to adopt this interpretation in the short term.211 The Bill
of Rights and religious liberty are thought of as “American” rights, not just
“federal” rights.212 Much of the public takes for granted that the religion clauses
will be applicable against the states, regardless of what the historical evidence
presents.213 Furthermore, since the Supreme Court long ago held that the
religion clauses apply to the states,214 it would be disruptive to depart from that
settled position in favor of an uncertain, historical perspective, even if

209. Id. at 247 (internal citations omitted).
210. See Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 695 (1989) (“Larson
teaches that, when it is claimed that a denominational preference exists, the initial inquiry is whether
the law facially differentiates among religions.”); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338–39 (1987) (dismissing the plaintiffs’
argument that the Larson test should apply, stating that “Larson indicates that laws discriminating
among religions are subject to strict scrutiny . . . [and] we see no justification for applying strict
scrutiny to a statute that passes the Lemon test.”); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984)
(justifying the refusal to use the Lemon test in Larson); see also Russell W. Galloway, Basic
Establishment Clause Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 845, 853 (1989) (discussing strict
scrutiny in the Establishment Clause analysis).
211. See supra Part II.D.
212. See HAMBURGER, supra note 33, at 434–49.
213. Id.
214. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947). In discussing the incorporation of the
Establishment Clause to the States, the Everson Court elaborated:
The First Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth, commands that
a state “shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.” These words of the First Amendment reflected in the minds of early
Americans a vivid mental picture of conditions and practices which they fervently wished
to stamp out in order to preserve liberty for themselves and for their posterity. Doubtless
their goal has not been entirely reached; but so far has the Nation moved toward it that
the expression “law respecting an establishment of religion,” probably does not so vividly
remind present-day Americans of the evils, fears, and political problems that caused that
expression to be written into our Bill of Rights.
Id. The proposition that the First Amendment, including the Establishment Clause, applies to the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment remains a well-settled claim; however, Justice Thomas is one
of the few opponents of this position. See supra Part II.D.

2015]

Town of Greece v. Galloway and the Establishment Clause

407

plausible.215 Nevertheless, the federalism consideration otherwise can be taken
into some account.
Accordingly, this Essay proposes that the appropriate standard of review for
Establishment Clause cases regarding state action should be rational basis or
intermediate scrutiny. Alternatively, evaluating federal action under the
Establishment Clause should be subject to strict scrutiny, as an overwhelming
majority of evidence points to the purpose and intent of the Establishment Clause
being a prohibition of an established national religion.216 However, all cases
implicating the Free Exercise Clause, whether state or federal, should be subject
to strict scrutiny.217 Inasmuch as the Free Exercise Clause was meant to protect
an individual right, it was reasonably incorporated against the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment.218
Town of Greece did not discuss which level of scrutiny is appropriate.219 This
is unsurprising given the Court’s trend of staying away from discussing
standards of review since the Larson Court and moving towards using judicially
made tests.220 The Court, however, stated that “[a]ny test the Court adopts must
acknowledge a practice that was accepted by the Framers and has withstood the
critical scrutiny of time and political change.”221 This suggests that this area of
the law is better suited to the legislature, which can better adjust to the changes
in time and politics.222 Relatedly, the actions of the Framers surrounding the
Establishment Clause may be a result of the political discourse of the time it was
enacted.
This Essay’s proposal to adjust the level of scrutiny is not as simple as it
sounds.223 The question of appropriate scrutiny is subject to even more debate
than the Establishment Clause.224 This Essay does not attempt to single215. See supra Part II.C.
216. See DRAKEMAN, supra note 29, at 231; see also Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct.
1811, 1835 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“As an initial matter, the [Establishment] Clause
probably prohibits Congress from establishing a national religion.”).
217. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1972) (applying strict scrutiny review to
Free Exercise Clause analysis); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402–03 (1963) (applying the
same review).
218. See DRAKEMAN, supra note 29, at 141.
219. See generally Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (focusing primarily on historical precedent
without mentioning any level of appropriate scrutiny).
220. See Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 695 (1989); Corp. of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339
(1987); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984).
221. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1819.
222. See id.
223. Many church-state cases and proposals also implicate equal protection issues. A full
discussion of these issues is outside the scope of this Essay, but is encouraged for future research.
224. See DRAKEMAN, supra note 29, at 337–45; Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test that Ate
Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783,
784; Michael J. Burstein, Towards a New Standard for First Amendment Review of Structural
Media Regulation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1030, 1034 (2004); Clay Calvert & Justin B. Hayes, To Defer
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handedly solve the problems of Establishment Clause jurisprudence or answer
every question regarding proper levels of scrutiny in religion cases. Instead, it
hopes to open the door to further discussion about this possibility and whether
adjusting the level of scrutiny better reflects the Framers’ intent and the original
meaning of the Clause regarding deference to state government action.
V. CONCLUSION
An examination of the Establishment Clause jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court makes clear that this area of the law is in hopeless disarray. When the
Supreme Court recently had the opportunity to substantially clarify the law in
Town of Greece v. Galloway, it was unwilling or unable to do so.225 For the
Establishment Clause jurisprudence to reach a point of hopeful clarity seems
impossible. While the Court’s ability to make the Establishment Clause doctrine
consistent and sensible may be in the distant future, modest steps toward that
goal can be taken sooner. This Essay aims to spark discussion regarding this
area of the law and whether amending the level of scrutiny could be an
improvement for Establishment Clause cases moving forward.

or Not To Defer? Deference and its Differential Impact on First Amendment Rights in the Roberts
Court, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 13, 15–16 (2012); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age
of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094, 3096–97 (2015); R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review
Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual
Rights: The “Base Plus Six” Model and Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
225, 225–26 (2002).
225. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1819.

